Aircraft referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this approved declaration must be distinguished, on the basis of functionally related observable differences, from aircraft that would otherwise be of the same type but would not be able to perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometres or for ASBMs. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in November 1969 and limited both the Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which limited strategic missile defence to 200 interceptors each (100 years later), and the interim agreement, an executive agreement, US and Soviet intercontinental missiles (ICBM) and U-boat missiles (SLBM). As part of the interim agreement, both parties committed not to build new ICBM silos, not to “significantly” increase the size of existing ICBMs, and to limit the number of SLBM starter tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers, so both sides were free to increase their armed forces by placing several warheads (MIRVs) on their ICBMs and SLBMs and strengthening their bomber forces. The agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM starter tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM starter tubes. In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty. SALT II The parties also exchanged initial statements on the number of strategic offensive weapons available to them and agreed to maintain this database agreed by periodic updates at each SSC meeting. They made a joint statement on the principles and directions for subsequent negotiations on strategic arms control.
The parties agreed to continue negotiations on new quantitative and qualitative restrictions on strategic weapons, to implement additional review measures to increase the effectiveness of them, and to take further steps to ensure and improve the strategic stability and security of the parties. Even after the Vladivostok agreements, the two nations were unable to resolve the other two outstanding issues of SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation`s arsenal. The first was made more difficult by the Soviet Bomber Backfire, which American negotiators thought could reach the United States, but which the Soviets did not want to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to limit the American use of cruise air missiles (ALCMs). The audit also divided the two nations, but they eventually agreed on the use of National Technical Means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo recognition satellites.